God Does Not Know Particulars; The Avicenna–Ghazālī Debate [2]

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Summary

Ghazālī’s criticisms of Avicenna’s account of divine knowledge are examined through the problems of prayer, justice, prophecy, and the relationship between God’s knowledge and time.

Writing

Ghazālī’s objections to Avicenna regarding the claim that “God does not know particulars”:

What does Avicenna claim? God does not know particulars in a temporal and item-by-item manner; rather, He knows them through universal principles. In contrast, Ghazālī argues that God knows particulars individually, directly, and completely; otherwise, God would be rendered deficient.

At this point, you should also reflect on the issue yourself: Does knowing through universal principles truly render God deficient? And how do the positions of these two thinkers align with Qur’anic verses?

Let us consider both claims in the form of arguments.

Avicenna:

1. God is absolutely simple (non-composite).
2. God is immutable.
3. A changing knowledge implies a changing subject.
4. Particulars (events) are temporal and subject to change.

Conclusion: God cannot know particulars as momentary events in the way human beings do.

But is God truly “simple” (basīṭ)? Is divine knowledge immutable, and how should this be understood in relation to the Qur’an? Should the Qur’an be approached within this framework, or should it be read more historically?

Let us not distort Avicenna’s position. He does not say “God does not know”; he says, “God’s way of knowing does not resemble ours.”

So let us ask Avicenna more precisely: How does God know?

Avicenna:

1. God knows Himself.
2. He is the first cause of all existence.
3. One who knows causes knows effects at the level of principles.
4. One who knows principles knows everything universally.

Conclusion: God knows particulars not as particulars, but as the laws and causes that make them possible.

Avicenna’s account may be difficult to conceptualize. How can one who knows laws and causes possess knowledge of events as they occur, if there is no moment-by-moment observation? Should God know that “Ali has finished his meal and is now going to wash his hands,” or is it sufficient to know which choices generate which processes?

Now let us turn to Ghazālī’s objections, again in argumentative form.

Ghazālī states: “If God does not know particulars, this amounts to attributing deficiency to God.”

Ghazālī:

1. Knowing is a perfection (kamāl).
2. Even human beings know particulars.
3. It is impossible for God to know less than humans.
4. To say “the mode of knowing is different”
5. effectively amounts to saying “He does not know.”

Conclusion: God’s knowledge may be timeless, but it must encompass particulars.

This raises another question: If God knows particulars moment by moment, yet what appears to us as billions of years is a single instant for Him, is it possible for God to intervene in events at will, as imagined in the religious consciousness?

Ghazālī continues his critique through the problem of prayer.

If God does not know particular situations, how is “my present state” known? To whom is prayer addressed? According to Ghazālī, prayer becomes meaningless if God does not know particulars.

But perhaps we misunderstand prayer. As I have argued before, verbal prayer may function as motivation, whereas actual prayer consists in action itself, which initiates change. This is not a defense of Avicenna, but an open inquiry.

Ghazālī also raises the problem of justice.

• Heaven and hell,
• Sin and merit,
• Moral responsibility,

All of these depend on particular acts. Ghazālī asks how a God who does not know particular acts can judge justly.

The problem of prophethood also emerges here: Revelation, miracles, historical events— all occur at specific times, involving specific persons and specific events. According to Ghazālī, if God does not know particulars, the entire history of revelation collapses.

This leads us to another question: When a timeless God intervenes in time, does He do so through beings we identify as angels, or do such events emerge as outcomes of lived processes themselves?

At the core of this debate lies God’s mode of knowing, which is inseparable from the problem of time. The fundamental question is this: Must divine knowledge resemble human knowledge?

Avicenna: No—if it does, God is diminished.
Ghazālī: No—it does not resemble it, but its scope cannot be diminished.

As for my current position, I would tentatively say: God knows systems; as humans choose, outcomes unfold.

Yet my thoughts on this issue are not definitive; I am still reflecting on it.